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In recent times, many surveys have reported instances of
fraud at workplaces. What is even more alarming is the
finding that frauds committed by employees are more
common than those by persons external to the organisation
(Shaw, 2002). Such revelations have shocked and disap-
pointed the corporate world and have had far-reaching)44 2257 4556; fax: þ91 (0)44
a.edu (P. Nair), tjk@iitm.ac.
Management Bangalore. All
ponsibility of Indian Institutenegative consequences on investors, clients and employees.
It has also underlined the need to encourage lateral report-
ing of infractions by employees in an attempt to curtail
violations.
Psychologists suggest that people living together come to
control one another through expectations of ethical behav-
iour (Rogers & Skinner, 1956). Ethical behaviour elicits
rewards in the form of appreciation, admiration, and
affection which, in turn, act as reinforcements that ensure
continuance. If fairness and morality are indeed parts of
human nature, then employees should also be reporting
about the unethical acts (i.e., coming late, using office time
for personal work, making false promises to customers, etc.)
of their peers to the organisation. In Western countries,
organisations expect their employees to be the silent police
and encourage them to report the ethical violations of their
peers (Victor, Trevino, & Shapiro, 1993). Surprisingly,
however, employees in Indian organisations seem to be
unwilling to report unethical behaviour of their peers to the
management. The TeamLease ‘Nothing ethical about ethics’
(2008) survey threw up startling findings on the views of the
corporate workforce onworkplace ethics. Nearly 45% people
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object to logging of incorrect entry/exit times and 46.8% felt
using the office telephone for personal long-distance calls
was fine. Around 60% people lied while applying for leave,
supported making tall promises to clients, or considered it
okay to take printouts and photocopies at office for personal
work. More than 62% admitted to doing personal work during
office hours. The fallout of unethical behaviour of employees
and the apathy of their peers towards reporting on infrac-
tions can critically affect a company’s image, stock value,
customer retention, ability to recruit and retain topworkers,
and ultimately, its ability to compete successfully. Conse-
quently, the authors raise the question as to why employees
who notice such infractions are unwilling to report the same
in an attempt to curtail potential infractions and salvage
their organisations.
One explanation for unwillingness to report infractions
can be the breakdown of the underlying psychological
process of an individual’s moral self-regulation. Regulatory
self-sanction when deactivated creates morally disengaged
individuals who have a predisposition for detrimental
behaviour (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli,
1996) and may be more tolerant of infractions. Given this
result, we propose a model of unwilling to report ethical
infractions of peers to the management. Our model (see
Fig. 1) proposes organisational context factors that influ-
ence unwillingness of employees to report infractions
committed by their peers. We suggest that moral disen-
gagement mediates the relation between organisational
antecedents and peer reporting and that employee’ cyni-
cism and level of ethical empowerment moderate the
above relationship.
Ethical decision-making process
The process of ethical decision-making (deciding on a series
of actions that are legally and morally acceptable to the
larger community) progresses through four stages as
proposed in the model of moral action (Rest, 1986).
Accordingly, individuals (i) recognise a moral issue through
moral awareness that a decision or action may help or harm
others, (ii) make a moral judgement about the issue in a
way that moral concerns override other concerns,
(iii) establish an intention to act upon the judgement, andMediating relationship   
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Figure 1 A moderated mediation model of peer reporting.(iv) act out intentions. Each stage does not automatically
lead to the subsequent stage. When a moral issue is rec-
ognised, a moral judgement needs to be made on it. Making
a moral judgement is facilitated by an individual’s cognitive
moral development (Kohlberg, 1976) that operates in
a range of six stages that form three levels of moral
developmentdthe pre-conventional level characterised by
behaviour driven by fear and self-interest, the conventional
level wherein individuals act out of a desire for inter-
personal accord and harmony and finally, the post-
conventional level in which universal ethical principles
guide behaviour. It has subsequently been found that indi-
viduals generally perform at moral development levels
lower than what they are morally capable of (Levine, 1979)
with managers using lower levels of cognitive moral
development in actual work environments compared to
hypothetical situations (Trevino, 1986). Moral development
and consequently judgement may thus be context depen-
dent with organisational factors like the socialisation
process, authority factors and group dynamics influencing
what an individual regards as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ at work and
in so doing, worsen his moral intentions.Reasons for unethical behaviour
Several studies have explained why good people do bad
things. With respect to organisational employees, Jones
(1991) defined unethical conduct as behaviour which has
a harmful effect upon others and is either illegal or morally
unacceptable to the larger community. Such behaviour can
begin with seemingly minor infractions such as fudging time
sheets in order to meet unrealistic billing budgets, taking
credit for others’ work, and putting self or departmental
interests above the client’s interests (Lagan, 2006). The
ongoing debate among organisational researchers is about
identifying whether unethical conduct is the result of bad
applesdunethical behaviour attributed to personal char-
acteristics, dispositions or due to a bad barreldorganisa-
tional or situational variables that trigger misconduct. It is
caused by lack of wisdom (Feiner, 2004) or virtue
(Giacalone, 2004) and an overemphasis on maximising
shareholder value without regards for the effects of their
actions on other stakeholders (Kochan, 2002). Profit-sharing
programmes that intend to align management’s interests
with those of the owners put pressure and provide an
opportunity for managers to behave unethically. Love for
money has once again been seen as a reason for evil (Tang &
Chiu, 2003; Vitell, Paolillo, & Singh, 2006, 2007) and
unethical behaviour among university students (Tang,
Chen, & Sutarso, 2007). Moral evaluation of an act can be
a deterrent to unethical conduct and negative perception
of the outcome may lessen chances of indulgence. Inter-
estingly, unethical behaviour has been found to be consid-
erably encouraged by significant others in organisations,
especially superiors (Smith, Simpson, & Huang, 2007), with
the social network of relationships at work (Brass,
Butterfield, & Skaggs, 1998) providing constraints and
opportunities that in combination with individual charac-
teristics, issues and organisational contexts help account
for unethical behaviour. If so, organisational context may
account for a lowering of an individual’s moral standard.
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In their review of empirical decision-making literature,
O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005) found 28 research studies on
moral awareness, 185 for judgement, 86 for moral intent,
and 85 for behaviour all based on the model of moral action
(Rest, 1986). Unfortunately, only a few account for why and
how an individual fails to make a moral judgement (e.g.,
Hunt & Vitell, 1986) resulting in forming an unethical
intention. In addition, a number of important questions
remain unanswered regarding the source(s) and role of
cognitive processes like moral disengagement as a causal
variable in unethical behaviour among employees. Extant
studies do not fully explain the role of organisational factors
in influencing employee unwillingness to report unethical
behaviour, and the mechanism(s) through which organisa-
tional context variables influence such unwillingness. The
current article addresses these questions through the de-
velopment of a conceptual model (see Fig. 1) comprising
organisational context factors that may increase unwilling-
ness of employees to report ethical infractions committed
by their peers. Detert, Trevino and Sweitzer (2008) point out
that the social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986) and the
interactionist perspective (Trevino, 1986) suggest social and
context variables in an organisation as being predictors of
moral disengagement. Hence, we view the role of moral
disengagement as a mediator of the aforesaid relationship.
Also, we posit that moral disengagement is likely to influ-
ence ethical intentions more when employees are cynical
towards their organisation and when their understanding of
organisational ethical codes is inadequate. Thus, ours is
a moderated mediation model of peer reporting.
Unwillingness of employees to report ethical
infractions of peers
Our goals are to understand the dynamics of peer reporting
and to identify organisational, social and personal factors
that influence it. Employees of any organisation occasionally
witness peers committing an infraction. Infractions can
include a variety of different behaviours, the most common
being making long-distance personal calls from office,
duplicating software for use at home, falsifying the number
of hours worked, or much more serious and illegal practices,
such as embezzling money from the business, or falsifying
business records. The definition of certain acts as consti-
tuting an infraction is done through an organisation’s ethical
code of conduct that reflects its core values. It is, therefore,
for specific organisations to decide on what constitutes an
infraction and on how to deal with infractions further.
Two aspects of unwillingness to report infractions need
mention. The first is that identifying and reporting ethical
infractions committed by peers are actually a test of an
employee’s own values and ethical behaviour. When an
employee observes a peer behaving in a way that she/he
knows is wrong by the company’s standards, her/his own
sense of what is right and what is wrong gets instantly
verified. Anchored in those internal standards is the deci-
sion whether to report the incident or turn a blind eye to it.
The second aspect is the direction given to an employee ofwhat is expected of her/him on witnessing an infraction.
The ethical codes developed and implemented by organi-
sations typically include information on whom to contact to
report and how. This clarity is intended to lessen hesitation
in reporting unethical activities which can then be dealt
with before they develop into overwhelming issues.
It must be acknowledged that declaration of ethical
codes in itself has limited influence on ethical perceptions
and behaviour with employees even failing to recollect the
contents of such codes (Weaver, 1995). Further, even when
ethical codes influence behaviour, their impact is smaller
than factors such as employee perception of fairness,
leader commitment, and the overall ethical culture of the
organisation (Weaver, 2004).
Formal mechanisms such as ethical codes and informal
influences like ethical climate often offer conflicting
messages to employees creating ambiguity that widens the
wedge between prescriptions in the ethical code and actual
employee behaviour. Knowing how willing employees would
be to report ethical infractions under these circumstances
would be of interest to researchers and managers alike.
Organisational antecedents of unwillingness to
report peer infractions
A prime influence on employee behaviour is the organisa-
tion’s climate. Organisational climate, particularly the
ethical one, is primarily shaped by its leadership
(Schwepker, 2001). Employees’ evaluation of ethical
climate, which includes ‘those aspects of work climate that
determine what constitutes ethical behaviour at work’
(Victor & Cullen, 1988, p. 101), has been found to be based
on not only their personal beliefs and values but also on
cues received from their managers and coworkers. Such
appraisals include employee perceptions of (a) their supe-
rior’s integrity, (b) infractions committed by their peers, (c)
the linkage between unethical behaviour and punitive
action against wrong-doers, and (d) the clarity they have on
the ethical behaviour expected while at work. The possible
influences that germinate from the organisational envi-
ronment and influence ethical intentions are as follows.
Immoral leadership
Even though formal codes provide direction in ethical
decision-making (Elankumaran, Seal, & Hashmi, 2005), an
immediate and significant influence would be managers and
peers. An individual’s ethical definitions are generally
learnt through socialisation (Zey-Ferrell, Weaver, & Ferrell,
1979). It is, therefore, desirable that superiors and other
senior managers are men/women of integrity. Integrity is
a ‘commitment in action to a morally justified set of prin-
ciples and values’ (Becker, 1998, p. 157). We describe
integrity as explicitly confirming the fit between what
managers say and do. Managerial behaviours support the
organisation’s missions and value statements. Employees
expect managers to act consistently with how someone in
the position of manager ought to act (Simons, 2002). Such
a representation enables employees to assess the extent to
which their superiors act ethically and consistently with
organisational codes.
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ance with the prescriptions of ethical codes, and employees
are influenced by such unethical behaviours. For example,
he or she may take a less ethical decision even while holding
a high personal standard of ethics (Zey-Ferrell, Weaver, &
Ferrell, 1979), such behaviour being an imitation of the
unethical leader (Dukerich, Nichols, Elm, & Vollrath, 1990).
Cases of immoral leadership like that of Ramalinga Raju of
Satyam Computers do make us doubt the moral standards of
topmanagement andworry about its percolation downward.
Raju, who by his own admission, committed major financial
fraud resigned as the Chairman only when his last-ditch
efforts to fill the ‘fictitious assets with real ones’ through
Maytas’ acquisition failed (Indian Express, January 7, 2009).
Under comparable circumstances, managers down the line
may find little benefit in reporting smaller infractions
because actions of the senior management are far removed
from the high standards of integrity they claim to pursue. A
superior with a dubious ethical recordwouldmake an ethical
infraction harder to report for subordinates.
Analysis of the relationship between perceived leader
integrity and employee behaviours has found a significant
positive correlation between psychological contract breach
and absenteeism and a significant negative correlation
between psychological contract breach and in-role perfor-
mance (Johnson & O’Leary-Kelly, 2003). In their meta-anal-
ysis of studies on behavioural integrity of leaders, Davis and
Rothstein (2006) include job satisfaction, organisational
commitment and positive and/or negative affect towards the
organisation as dependent variables and find a strong positive
relationship overall. They conclude with a call for further
research on leader integrity and its impact on employee
behavioural outcomes as well as potential moderators of the
relationship. Hence, we propose further research on the
above relationship in terms of peer reporting.
Absence of linkage between unethical behaviour
and organisational sanctions
Employees would be encouraged to report infractions only
when they see a linkage between unethical acts and
organisational sanctions imposed on offenders in the past.
While most companies attempt to curb unethical behaviour,
some are more tolerant if the unethical decision leads to an
economic benefit (Laczniak & Murphy, 1991).
Earlier studies have found instances when managers
administered less severe discipline to top sales performers
as compared to lower performers (e.g., Bellizzi, 2006).
Such discretionary treatment suggests to employees that
their managers are willing to compromise on ethical stan-
dards. A fallout of this could be a lowering of employee
morale and scruples even among those who initially had
fairly high ethical standards. Leniency and condoning acts
of unethical behaviour are thus bound to lead employees to
believe that their firm has a climate that supports mis-
behaviour or at least does not punish it (Jackall, 1988). This
is expected to discourage reporting of ethical infractions.
Unsatisfactory methods of performance evaluation
Another constituent of an organisation’s climate is the
method of employee appraisal. Many organisations nowadaysuse the Forced Ranking method (popularly known as Alter-
nation Ranking) of appraisal. It is a differentiation process
where managers are required to evaluate an employee’s
performance based on predetermined categories against
other employees in the department or peer group (Gary,
1990). These employee performance rankings are then
applied to a normal curve. Those who rank at the bottom
(usually 10%) are put on probation, coached to improve
performance, or terminated. Those at the top of the curve
(top 20%) are generously rewarded (Grote, 2005). Forced
Ranking has been found to create a politicised atmosphere in
organisations where individuals lobby for beneficial positions
with the most influential managers and managers may make
deals, negotiate, or evenmanipulate the system to keep their
employees (Bates, 2004; Miesler, 2003). Though it creates
excessive competitive pressure, one positive consequence
could be the incentive it offers for reporting peer infractions.
Ethical ambiguity
For employees to be willing to supervise and report on
others there has to be clarity about the organisation’s
ethical expectations of them. Ethical ambiguity is the
degree of uncertainty an employee experiences on how she/
he should behave in the day-to-day work performance.
Ambiguity is a sign of a lack of perceived clarity on ethical
expectations from employees (Spekman & Salmond, 1992 as
cited in Robertson & Rymon, 2001). It is likely that formal
mechanisms such as ethical codes and informal influences
like organisational culture offer conflicting messages to
employees on the desired mode of conduct. For instance,
a junior manager in a leading Indian pharmaceutical
company recollects being chastised by his boss for insisting
on discarding a container of a bulk drug that was to be made
into tablets as the surface was found contaminated with
rust particles even when the ethical code accorded top
priority to customer safety. The boss suggested skimming
the surface to ‘salvage’ the consignment and contain costs.
Such situations, occurring in every-day organisational life,
contribute to confusion and ethical ambiguity for employees
and thereby widen the wedge between prescriptions in the
ethical code and actual employee behaviour.
Ambiguity in organisational expectation restrains
employees from judging peer behaviour and further
reporting infractions. Past studies have found that the
strength of an organisation’s ethical culture and the exis-
tence of a code of conduct are negatively related to
unethical behaviour (Trevino, 1990). Therefore, organisa-
tions ought to attempt to reduce ethical ambiguity by
ensuring that provisions of ethical codes are well commu-
nicated to employees. Training and orientation in codes can
be prime sources of ethical learning (Stevens, 1999) and
may help clarify the company’s expectations from
employees in ethically sensitive situations (Dubinsky &
Gwin, 1981). But when organisational expectations of
behaviour are not stated upfront or if their communication
is inconsistent, or their expectations are contradictory,
ethical ambiguity is likely to set in.
Another source of ethical ambiguity could be the actions
of a few who form a dominant coalition and project their
interests as the organisation’s interests. The actions of such
employees, especially if they happen to be higher up in the
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contradict the espoused values and expectations of the
organisation (Jansen & Von Glinow, 1985). We, therefore,
posit that ethical ambiguity prompts employees to refrain
from reporting infractions.
Pressure to perform
Recent years have seen organisations focussing on reor-
ganisation, innovation and operational efficiency, and
introducing several exciting new products. Consequently,
the speed of functioning and pressure to perform on
employees has also amplified (Srivastava & Bhatnagar,
2008). Organisations today are highly cost conscious. As
profit margins get squeezed, employees come under
tremendous pressure to bring in results with fewer
resources for performance. Such undue pressure to perform
has been considered as a reason for unethical behaviour in
organisations (Bellizzi, 2006). In particular, pressure to
perform results in deceptive behaviour and thereby reduces
the level of ethicality in the context of purchase agents
(Robertson & Rymon, 2001). As Jackall (1988) has argued,
unethical behaviours need not be due to an individual’s
personality or value system but the result of an interaction
with the work context. Unrealistic expectations, fewer
resources and strict deadlines place tremendous demands
on employees. Consequently, they may resort to unethical
means for achieving organisational goals.
Psychologists have been suggesting that work pressure
has a dysfunctional effect on performance of cognitive and
motor tasks (e.g., Beilock & Carr, 2005). Reduced cognitive
ability results in poorer evaluations of a given situation
(Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Inadequate evaluations of ethical
codes and norms of behaviour come in the way of estab-
lishing a moral intent which is necessary for reporting
unethical behaviour.
Intra-organisational competition
Organisations have long been using competition for
rewards, status and even survival as a motivational tech-
nique (Churchill, Ford, & Walker, 1997). A competitive
environment induces employees to perceive their rewards
to be contingent upon comparisons of their performance
against their peers (Brown, Cron, & Slocum, 1998), adding
to performance pressure.
A competitive environment also creates counter norms
that are often incompatible with the espoused normative
beliefs and values of an organisation. For example, if
‘follow the rules’ is the organisational norm, ‘break the
rules to get the job done’ may be the prevailing counter
norm that gets practised in an atmosphere of intense
competition (Jansen & Von Glinow, 1985). Widespread
norms contrary to ethical codes can reduce the willingness
of employees to report infractions.
Witnessing peers commit ethical infractions
Ethical decision-making of individuals is not only influenced
by formal organisational rules but also by what others,
including peers, say is right (Brass, Butterfield, & Skaggs,1998). Peer behaviour is a significant antecedent of an indi-
vidual’s ethical behaviour (Deshpande, 2009). Discussions on
the influence of one bad apple on the entire barrel (Gino,
Ayal, & Ariely, 2009) bring out three possible ways in which
such negative contagion may be transmitted. First, seeing
a peer indulge in an infraction and get away with it changes
an individual’s estimation of the chances of getting caught,
thereby increasing both the likelihood of committing an
infraction and the seriousness of the crime. Second, such
social norms of behaviour observed among peers have been
found to impinge upon people’s immediate behaviour
through social learning (Bandura, 1965). Yet, it could happen
that when unethical behaviour of others is made salient to
people, they will pay greater attention to their own behav-
iour and probably judge it more strictly. The overwhelming
evidence however seems to suggest that peer ethical
behaviour exerts a strong influence not only on the ethical
behaviour of managers but on the organisational ethical
environment as well (Keith, Pettijohn, & Burnett, 2003).
Witnessing peers commit infractions may thus desensitise
managers thereby reducing their motivation to report.
Degree of task and outcome interdependence with
peers who commit infractions
Many employees work on assignments that are high on
interdependence i.e., some team members have to depend
on their peers for information, resources and support,
(Taggar & Haines, 2006). Interdependence has been found
to be a desired characteristic of high performing teams
(Van der Vegt & Van de Vliert, 2002). Interdependent tasks
often have interdependent outcomes when group members
are presented with group goals or provided with group
feedback. In such circumstances, individual members’
motives can only be satisfied if the team performs well.
This requires group members’ attention and effort directed
to collective performance instead of individual perfor-
mance (Locke & Latham, 1990).
In the context of collective performance expectations,
cooperation is positively related to both task and psycho-
social outcomes including greater member satisfaction
(Pinto & Pinto, 1990; Pinto, Pinto, & Prescott 1993). A
negative consequence of the need to cooperate and follow
norms of team behaviour could be a reluctance to report on
any peer infraction.
Themediating roleofmoraldisengagemente (M)
People generally view themselves as moral and try to appear
moral to others (e.g., Batson, Thompson, Seuferling,
Whitney, & Strongman, 1999). Hence, when people recog-
nise an ethical dilemma, they attempt to act ethically to
maintain a consonant self-image. Ethical recognition,
though essential by itself, is inadequate for ensuring ethical
behaviour. A supplementary process of ethical judgement is
required, whereby individuals judge their behaviour as
acceptable and form an intention to behave accordingly
(Rest, 1986). Ethical judgement thus operates as a self-
regulatory mechanism that controls moral conduct.
Self-regulation, however, can be selectively deactivated
(Bandura, 1999). This deactivation or moral disengagement is
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apply in particular contexts (Barsky, Islam, Zyphur, &
Johnson, 2006). Such a deactivation enables otherwise
ethical people to perform self-serving acts that have detri-
mental social effects. Perhaps selective activation and
disengagement of moral control can explain why individuals
takevariedethical stances dependingon their circumstances.
Mechanisms for moral disengagement
The disengagement of self-regulation happens through
eight interrelated mechanisms: moral justification, euphe-
mistic labelling, advantageous comparison, displacement of
responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, disregarding or
distortion of consequences, dehumanisation, and attribu-
tion of blame (Bandura, 2002). These mechanisms form
three broad categories.
Cognitive restructuring of harmful conduct
Moral justification
Detrimental conduct is made acceptable by portraying it as
social and moral. Dissonance created by unethical decisions
is reduced by cognitively redefining it as beneficial to the
organisation and necessary for survival in the job. A factory
manager, for example, may justify dumping of untreated
effluents into a nearby river by blaming the government for
not offering concessions to factories that install expensive
treatment facilities. Not investing in effluent treatment is
justified because the additional financial burden of
installing effluent treatment could potentially make the
factory unviable, leading to closure and job losses.
Euphemistic labelling
The use of sanitised language to describe an action so as to
make it less revolting is called euphemistic labelling. For
example, medical representatives term the giving of gifts
to doctors to ‘motivate’ them to prescribe their brand of
drugs as ‘business development’. India has a huge pop-
ulation with diverse untreated diseases who have not yet
been exposed to a wide array of biomedical drugs that most
Western patients have. Multinational drug companies call
this an ‘Indian Advantage’ to defend rampant and often
illegal clinical trials of a wide variety of drugs.
Advantageous comparison
When harmful conduct is made to look good in comparison
with other actions, it is called advantageous comparison.
For example, a sales manager may justify paying a bribe to
effect a sale by first judging the option of non-payment as
ineffective in getting the sale. Advantageous comparison
with the actual or anticipated threat of a competitor selling
an ‘inferior product’ further affirms the stand that the
bribe benefits not just the seller but the buyer too.
Minimising the role of the individual in
perpetration of harm
Displacement of responsibility
Moral controls operate when one knows that the harm
caused is attributable to oneself. Disengagement operatesto obscure or minimise personal agency in the harm. For
example, when Global Trust Bank collapsed in 2003, its
promoter and ex-chairman Ramesh Gelli refused to take the
blame for the failure, claiming that he followed a hands-off
management style wherein operational responsibility had
been totally delegated to senior management (Business
Standard, July 24, 2004). Obedience to authority has also
been found to affect illegal intention, with managers
reporting higher prospective offending when they are
ordered to engage in misconduct by a supervisor. In such
cases, individuals perceived the outcome of an illegal/
unethical act less negatively when it was ordered by
a supervisor than when it was decided by themselves
(Smith, Simpson, & Huang, 2007).
Diffusion of responsibility
Division of labour (Kelman, 1973) wherein each person does
a subpart of a project obscures personal agency and
weakens the exercise of moral control. Group work
increasingly used in organisations today has been found to
be an ineffective means of achieving optimal results in
subjective areas like business ethics (O’Leary &
Pangemanan, 2007). Group decision-making, where
everyone is responsible but no one is identifiable, facili-
tates moral disengagement. For example, in the aftermath
of the Bhopal Gas Disaster of 1984, Union Carbide Corpo-
ration set out to diffuse responsibility for the accident with
the argument that all the employees in the plant were
Indians as the last American employee had left the site two
years before the accident (Ungarala, 1998).
Reframing the consequences of action
Disregard or distortion of consequences
Another method of weakening moral control operates by
disregarding or distorting the effects of one’s actions. This
is achieved by avoiding facing the harm caused or by min-
imising it. Organisations, with their hierarchical chain of
command, remove individuals further from the conse-
quences of their actions. Disengagement thus comes easily
for intermediaries as they neither bear responsibility for
the decision, nor carry them out and subsequently face the
consequences. For example, UK’s leading apparel manu-
facturer Primark snapped ties with three garment suppliers
from Tirupur in June 2008 for alleged use of child labour.
The Tirupur Exporters Association was quick in shifting the
blame to the subcontractors for the lapse and even dis-
torted the effects of their action as a gesture of ‘helping
out’ children from refugee families with work (Gurumurthy,
2008).
Dehumanisation
The restraining effects of self-censure can be mitigated
when the perpetrator of an unjust act views the receiver as
a dehumanised object. Bureaucratisation, automation,
urbanisation, high geographical mobility and power
increase impersonality (Bandura, 1999). New forms of
employment (e.g. part-time, freelance or contract work,
temporary work and job sharing) contribute to dehuman-
isation and make the position of such workers generally
precarious.
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Blaming one’s adversaries or circumstances is another way
of exonerating oneself of responsibility. Compelling
circumstances or provocation from others is offered as an
excuse for unethical behaviour, thereby circumventing
personal volition. When the Italian company Graziano’s CEO
L K Chaudhury was murdered in Noida, India by dismissed
employees in September 2008, the alleged employees
defended their action as being the outcome of simmering
discontent and disparity in the wages of permanent and
temporary workers (Roy, 2008). Further, in a Bhopal Gas
Tragedy report, Union Carbide claimed that the tragedy
resulted when a disgruntled plant employee, apparently
bent on spoiling a batch of methyl isocyanate, added water
to the storage tank (Browning, 1998).
Moral disengagement is not a stable personality trait but
a temporary state of mind. Since ethical orientations are
socially learnt (Kohlberg, 1984), there can be social and
organisational factors that contribute to its development.
Being unequivocally interactive in nature (Bandura, 2002),
moral disengagement can be prompted by the organisa-
tional context variables detailed above. The uses of many
of these mechanisms have been studied in psychological
research, organisational behaviour research and to
a limited extent in behavioural ethics research (Anand,
Ashford, & Joshi, 2005; Diener, 1977; Kelman, 1973;
Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1989). Moral disengagement has
been found to aid personnel in executing a death sentence
(Osofsky, Bandura, & Zimbardo, 2005), partially explain
illegal behaviour (Young, Zhang, & Prybotuk, 2007), facili-
tate and perpetuate organisational corruption (Moore,
2007), increase the propensity for unethical behaviour
among students (Detert et al., 2008), and act as a proximal
antecedent of unethical behaviour in group decision-
making situations (Barsky, 2008). Hence we propose:
Proposition 1. Moral disengagement mediates the relation-
ship between organisational antecedents and unwillingness
to report infractions by peers.
The moderating role of organisational cynicism
and ethical empowerment e (Z)
A variable that may alter the impact of the predictor on the
criterion is called a moderator. Ours is a moderated medi-
ation model wherein the mediating process of moral
disengagement that is responsible for producing the effect
of organisational antecedents on unwillingness to report,
should be different for employees differing in organisa-
tional cynicism and ethical empowerment.
Organisational cynicism
The global meltdown affecting every kind of industry has
altered employeeeemployer relations. Organisational
attempts at ‘rightsizing’ and ‘cost restructuring’ have made
employees increasingly cynical, believing that principles of
honesty, fairness, and sincerity are being sacrificed to
further the self-interests of leaders (Abraham, 2000).
Organisational cynicism is a negative attitude toward theorganisation. This attitude comprises (a) a belief that the
organisation lacks integrity, (b) negative feelings toward
the organisation, and (c) tendencies of disapproval and
critical behaviour toward the organisation consistent with
the above belief and feelings (Dean, Brandes, &
Dharwadkar, 1998).
Cynical employees are more likely to perceive inconsis-
tencies between organisational goals and practices and for
this reason doubt the integrity of their organisation. Yet,
unlike highly committed employees, they are less likely to
proactively raise these questions as this would create
a cognitive dissonance between their attitude and behav-
iour. People who question the integrity of their organisation
hardly need to be personally committed to it. A cynical
employee therefore believes that his/her organisation is
unscrupulous and self-serving and hence engages him- or
herself in disengagement.
We expect organisational cynicism to enhance the rela-
tionship between organisational antecedents and unwill-
ingness to report infractions, augment the relationship
between organisational antecedents and moral disengage-
ment, and finally decrease the inclination of a disengaged
employee to report peer infractions. We therefore suggest:
Proposition 2. Organisational cynicism moderates the
relationship between organisational antecedents and
unwillingness to report infractions by peers via moral
disengagement. Specifically, higher levels of organisational
cynicism strengthen the relationship between moral disen-
gagement and unwillingness to report infractions of peers.
Ethical empowerment
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines empowerment as
a process of enabling, giving official authority, and helping
self-actualisation. As a general definition, ethical empow-
erment is a multi-dimensional process that helps employees
gain control over their decisions and act in alignment with
ethical codes. It is a process that fosters power (i.e. the
capacity to implement the ethical code) on employees, by
enabling them to act ethically on issues that they define as
important. Three components of our definition are basic to
the understanding of ethical empowerment. First, it is
a multi-dimensional process. It is multi-dimensional because
it occurs within the formal structure and the informal
culture of the organisation. While the provisions and mech-
anism of the ethical code form its superstructure, the pre-
vailing ethical climate offers the support system. Second, it
is a social process because it occurs in relationship to peers
and superiors. Finally, it is a process that develops as the
organisation implements its code in letter and spirit. Ethical
empowerment is achievable when the ethical codes are
effectively communicated to employees, modelled by
leaders and become part of the organisational culture.
Hence, it progresses through three levels: (a) creating
awareness of the ethical codes by dissemination, (b) making
employees knowledgeable by putting them through educa-
tion, training, and role modelling, and (c) supporting ethical
choices through an organisational ethical culture. Ethical
principles, codes and training cannot anticipate most ethical
dilemmas that employees face. They can, however, provide
88 P. Nair, T.J. Kamalanabhanprocesses for ethical decision-making (Christensen & Kohls,
2003). Empowerment can offer an alternative to tradi-
tional prescriptive mechanisms of control.
Ethically empowered employees would be better able to
report infractions for they know that the organisation
would support their actions even in the wake of having an
unsupportive boss. On account of their deeper under-
standing and internalisation of the organisation’s ethical
codes, they would be able to better withstand the peer and
work pressure without succumbing to shortcuts to achieve
their targets.
We expect ethical empowerment to weaken the rela-
tionship between organisational antecedents and unwill-
ingness to report infractions, reduce the relationship
between organisational antecedents and moral disengage-
ment, and finally increase the inclination to report peer
infractions. Hence we suggest:
Proposition 3. Ethical empowerment moderates the rela-
tionship between organisational antecedents and unwilling-
ness to report infractions by peers via moral disengagement.
Specifically, higher levels of ethical empowerment weaken
the relationship between moral disengagement and unwill-
ingness to report infractions of peers.
Conclusion
In our view, unwillingness to report peer infractions is caused
by several organisational factors and their impact is moder-
ated by cynicism and empowerment. Moral self-regulation or
the capacity to exercise some measure of control over one’s
thought and actions, when deactivated, translates the
effects of these organisational factors into organisationally
detrimental behaviour such as not reporting peer infractions
when the ethical codes require one to do so. The extent to
which employees are ethically empowered as well as their
cynical attitudes towards the organisation impact the oper-
ation of moral disengagement thereby making way for the
moderated mediation model of peer reporting, presented in
this paper. A moderatedmediationmodel not only offers the
prospect of identifying cynicism among managers as an
attitude that aggravates the impact of moral disengagement
but more importantly suggests a solution in the form of
ethical empowerment which can diminish its influence.
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